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ABSTRACT 
Herbert Wulf: India’s Aspirations in Global Politics - Competing Ideas and Amorphous 
Practices 
India is an emerging power and its influence as well as the government’s aspirations in global 
politics has steadily been growing in recent years. The economy has experienced impressive 
growth but India’s political, social and economic development has neither been coherent nor 
smooth and millions of Indians still suffer from inequalities and poverty. The study looks at 
recent developments in India’s global aspirations, at the history of India’s foreign policy—with 
its shifts and changes—and at the ideological foundations of these different foreign affairs 
notions, namely idealism, realism and geopolitics, Hindu nationalism and the now 
predominant liberalisation and internationalisation concepts. In this report, the debate in India 
is reconstructed against the background of existing international relations theories. India has a 
great, but still largely untapped soft power potential and the capacity of integrating tradition 
and modernity, resulting in the creation of resilient institutions, a functioning federalism and an 
interesting amorphous character of the society with an aptitude for vagueness and 
improvisation to make things work. The report arrives at the conclusion that the Indian 
government is trying to play a greater role in global rule-making but does not want to change 
these rules fundamentally; it rather wants to enhance its status within the existing nation state 
oriented global governance system. 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Indien ist eine aufstrebende Macht und sowohl der Einfluss der Regierung als auch ihr 
Bestreben in der Weltpolitik eine größere Rolle zu spielen, sind in den letzten Jahren 
gewachsen. Die Wirtschaft hat ein beeindruckendes Wachstum erlebt, aber Indiens politische, 
soziale und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung ist weder kohärent noch glatt verlaufen; Millionen 
Inder sind weiterhin von Ungleichheit und Armut betroffen. Der Forschungsbericht befasst sich 
mit den jüngsten weltpolitischen Bemühungen Indiens, mit der Geschichte der Außenpolitik 
Indiens, ihren Veränderungen und ideologischen Grundlagen: dem Idealismus, dem Realismus 
und der Geopolitik, dem Hindu-Nationalismus und der jetzt vorherrschenden Liberalisierung 
und Internationalisierung. In diesem Report wird die indische Debatte vor dem Hintergrund 
der Theorien internationaler Beziehungen rekonstruiert. Indien hat ein großes, aber immer noch 
weitgehend unerschlossenes soft power-Potenzial. Drei funktionale sozio-kulturelle Faktoren 
verleihen der Gesellschaft Anpassungsfähigkeit und Widerstandskraft: die Fähigkeit zur 
Integration von Tradition und Moderne, die zur Schaffung von leistungsfähigen politischen 
und sozialen Institutionen geführt hat; ein weitgehend funktionierender Föderalismus und eine 
interessante, aber amorphe Begabung für Vagheit und Improvisation. Die indische Regierung 
versucht, eine größere Rolle in der globalen Norm- und Regelsetzung zu spielen. Dabei wird 
das existierende, stark nationalstaatlich orientierte global governance-System aber nicht 
grundsätzlich in Frage gestellt. 
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“We stand united in our efforts to address  
the deficit in global governance.” 
(Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India)1 
 
 
1. Introduction2  
What role will India play in the changing global order and what is the 
historical, cultural, political and economic basis of the government of India’s 
changing foreign policy approach? This study is largely based, though not 
exclusively, on recent publications (mainly reports and journal articles) from 
India and by Indian authors on Indian foreign policy and its perspectives. As 
far as their foreign policy evaluations, expectations and recommendations are 
concerned, the study reflects and refers to the assessments of a small but active 
group of foreign policy advisors, think tanks and research institutions that are 
primarily engaged in Indian foreign and security policy analysis. The report 
reconstructs the debate in India against the background of selected concepts of 
international relation theories. 
One of the outstanding features of most of these publications is their focus 
on the nation state and its role in foreign policy in the neighbourhood, the 
region and in global politics. Non-state actors are usually perceived only as a 
threat to security (most obviously so as pirates in the Indian Ocean or as 
terrorists, usually suspected of Pakistani origin as well as localised insurgencies 
by Naxalites who threaten the internal security). This is somewhat surprising 
since India has a vital civil society and Indian NGOs do play an active 
international role in some fields of foreign policy, for example, in the debates on 
climate change and other ecological issues. 
Indian researchers and strategic thinkers centre their analysis on Weberian-
type governance, with the nation state or the system of nation states as the 
focus, while post-national perspectives are more or less absent. To be sure, the 
Indian government and its foreign policy strategists aim at changes in the 
global governance system or at least insist on their own interpretation of 
emerging or changing norms. The government has begun to formulate its own 
ideas on the evolution of global norms; but the Indian concepts do not envision 
fundamental or structural changes but instead an intensified role of the Indian 
government in the existing system. Global norms are contested in concert with 
                                                          
1 Opening statement at the Plenary Session of the IBSA (India, Brazil, South 
Africa) Summit, Pretoria, 18.10.2011.   
http://pmindia.nic.in/speech-details.php?nodeid=1071 (26.03.2013). 
2 I would like to gratefully acknowledge comments and suggestions by 
colleagues at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research at the University 
of Duisburg-Essen on an earlier draft of the report. 
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other non-Western powers (e.g. within BRICS), but the emphasis is on the 
Westphalian state-dominated order rather than a new governance model.  
The debate in India focuses predominantly on traditional security-related 
foreign policy and diplomacy: India’s security in the region, conflicts in the 
neighbourhood, its role in peacekeeping, arms control forums, development of 
military power at home and abroad – these are focal points of the debate and 
most recommendations and advice from think tanks to the government address 
these kinds of issues. In recent years, however, two other areas have gained 
ground in the debate: India’s role in the international debate on climate change3 
and, more importantly, economic policy as a foreign policy tool.4 The trend to 
emphasise economic power emerged in parallel to the economic liberalisation 
policy of the last two decades (Wagner 2012) and is largely based on India’s 
growing economic power. India’s foreign economic and trade policy is reflected 
in promotion of foreign investments, in an enhanced role in international 
economic forums like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank and in India’s ambition to engage in economic aid in the immediate 
neighbourhood as well as in Africa. As will be illustrated below, in addition to 
the focus on security, peace and conflict the government’s concepts of foreign 
policy now include economic and trade issues. This is both the case with regard 
to economic relations with India’s Asian neighbours and in the global economic 
architecture. 
2. India as an Emerging Global Power 
2.1 India’s Star Is Rising 
India’s influence in global politics has steadily been growing in recent years and 
the government of India is keen to take responsibility for a major global role. 
This recent political constellation is partly due to a shift of global political 
interest and economic power towards Asia after the termination of the East-
West antagonism and the decline of the previous dominance of the United 
States. But it is also a result of the government of India’s rising political 
aspirations. Indian politicians, strategist and political scholars request an 
intensified global if not a great-power role: “India no longer wants to be mired 
in regional politics; rather, it wants to play a larger global role” concludes one 
researcher (Pattanaik 2010: 72), while others have since long requested that 
“India should break out of the claustrophobic confines of South Asia” (Gupta 
1997: 309). A leading foreign policy commentator and opinion-leader in Delhi 
emphasises that “India has tried to take its place as one of the great powers, a 
key player in international peace and security” (Mohan 2006: 18) and others 
                                                          
3 This aspect is not discussed in this report. 
4 Within international relations theory liberal perspectives do not ignore the 
importance of issues of war and peace. However, other issues like welfare, 
modernization and the environment are added to their focus of attention. 
See Holsti (1995: 43). 
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imply that India is on its way to become a superpower (Guha 2012) that should 
design strategies “to attain rule-making powers” (Singh 2011: 65).  
India’s phenomenal economic growth has contributed to the country’s 
political ambitions and, at the same time, a number of global governance 
concerns — the financial crisis, climate change and energy supplies and their 
security, possibly also arms control issues — require Indian participation for 
their successful negotiation and management. Since the world is no longer 
bifurcated into two antagonistic systems, and since no single dominant 
superpower emerged after the demise of the Soviet Union, India, with its 
economic and political weight, can use its influence to facilitate shaping global 
politics under the consideration of its own interest. With the emergence of 
multiple power centres India takes its place in the concert of the big powers. 
This is seen as a “great historical opportunity for India” (Khilani et al. 2012: 69, 
see also Mishra 2012). 
Much of the change in India’s external political and economic relations is 
driven by a small group of ambitious business people and political and military 
elite (Malik 2011). Their self-esteem and psycho-political dynamics are 
determining factors for India’s new global push. This drive has an economic 
basis. Indian capital invests strongly in many countries of the world; exports 
from India have increased, although not as spectacularly as China’s. Since its 
change towards a liberalised market after five decades of state-sponsored 
industrialisation the market still remains largely domestic. India has become 
one of the most interesting destinations for foreign investments.  
The financial crisis has had its effects on the Indian economy as well. Times 
of almost double-digit economic growth rates are gone and the future seems 
uncertain, not only because of global factors but also due to an inability to 
reform an economic and political system thoroughly that suffers from 
bureaucracy and corruption and is unable to effectively fight poverty and social 
inequality. The Indian economy needs, according to the Prime Minister, “an 
aggregate growth rate of 8 per cent per annum to create new job opportunities 
for more than 10 million persons who are going to enter our labour force each 
year.”5 The government is optimistic, though the Reserve Bank of India states 
that the growth outlook for 2012-13 “remains weak” (Reserve Bank of India 
2012: 8).  
One problem is the structure of employment. The agricultural sector, with 
less than 20% of GDP, employs half of the Indian workforce. The service sector, 
with 59% of GDP, continues to grow. New jobs created in this sector are, 
however, less numerous since they are more productive than in traditional 
sectors. What is missing, according to The Economist, is a strong and large 
                                                          
5 Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister’s address to the Combined Commanders’ 
Conference of India, 19.10. 2012.   
http://pmindia.nic.in/speech-details.php?nodeid=1238 (26.03.2013). 
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manufacturing sector: “More than other sectors, it suffers from India’s 
entrenched bureaucracy and wretched infrastructure.”6  
2.2 At the High Table of Global Affairs 
Given India’s status and long-term record as a stable, secular society and multi-
cultural democracy, the Indian political elite envisions its rank in global affairs 
in the top echelon. Accordingly, India’s wish to become a Permanent Member 
of the Security Council of the United Nations is in Indian perceptions not only 
legitimate but also long overdue (Khinlani et al. 2012: 34; Thakur 2011). Its 
insistence on being a nuclear weapons power and its annual high growth of 
investments in conventional weapons are instruments to underline India’s 
global ambitions and, at the same time, signal to its neighbours its claim for 
regional leadership, if not dominance.  
India’s present prowess and diplomatic determination show an extra-
ordinary degree of buoyancy and persistence. The government is pursuing a 
two-fold strategy to improve its global role and international recognition. It 
cooperates actively in such groupings as the G20 and is among the large 
contributors to UN peacekeeping operations, with over 8,000 police and troops 
out of a UN total of almost 100,000 at the beginning of 2012 (United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations 2012; Bhatnagar 2011; van Rooyen 2010). At the same 
time the Indian government, in its tradition of non-alignment, does not shy 
away from forcefully voicing its discontent with the work and composition of 
many political and economic global forums.7  
In the 1990s, India has been included in the BRICS initiative in which Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa offer their “partnership for global 
stability, security and prosperity”, the theme of the 2012 BRICS summit meeting 
in New Delhi.8 BRICS is a group of emerging economies, representing about 
40% of the world population, which questions some of the global political and 
economic decision-making processes (like the handling of the financial crisis, 
the role of the IMF and World Bank, and politics vis-à-vis Iran and Syria) and 
wants to exert its influence more strongly. India and the other members of 
BRICS want to reform the largely western-dominated global architecture (Legro 
2012: 643). 
                                                          
6 The Economist 2012: Express or stopping? India´s growth rate, supercharged 
for a decade, is falling back to older, lower levels, The Economist, 29.09.2012.  
http://www.economist.com/node/21563420 (26.03.2013). 
7 Manmohan Singh, India’s Prime Minister, said at the opening at the Plenary 
Session of the India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) Summit in Pretoria, 
18.10.2011: “The United Nations Security Council must be enlarged in order 
to reflect present day reality and to make it representative and effective in 
responding to global challenges.”   
http://pmindia.nic.in/speech-details.php?nodeid=1071 (26.03.2013). 
8 http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-
documents.htm?dtl/19158/Fourth+BRICS+Summit++Delhi+Declaration 
(26.03.2013) 
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However, BRICS is not a homogenous group and faces persistent challenges 
over whether it can unite on key issues. Given the diverse priorities of its 
members and their different political regimes, it is not surprising that their 
economic pull alone does not make a unified policy. Nevertheless, the Indian 
government is interested in increasingly defining its political role in order to 
match its economic clout. The Government engages in numerous other 
international forums at the regional and sub-regional level and tries to improve 
its relations to such institutions. 
To gain recognition as an important global player, if not as an emerging 
superpower, the Indian government wants to rely on its traditional non-
alignment policy and make use of the non-alliance movement. At the 2012 Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) in Teheran the Indian Prime Minister said:  
“Our Movement should take the lead in building global governance structures that are 
representative, credible and effective. It is my sincere hope that the Movement can agree on 
action to reform institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, the World Bank 
and the IMF. Existing problems cannot be solved effectively without a greater voice for 
developing countries on issues such as global trade, finance and investment.”9  
However, recommendations by leading foreign policy gurus usually mention 
the non-aligned policy as an aside; their real attention focuses upon the big 
player forums. 
2.3 India’s Regional Role and Domestic Restrictions 
India’s role and status in South East Asia is complicated, for both politico-
economic and security-related reasons. The complex and difficult relations are 
reflected in India’s long-standing conflict with Pakistan and their stagnating 
political relations and India’s often strained and fluctuating, almost competitive 
relations with China. In addition, the relations with smaller neighbours are not 
free of tension and domestic security concerns worry the society. 
2.3.1 Pakistan: Unresolved conflicts 
The relationship between the two countries is fraught with resentment and 
mistrust, and shaped by four wars. Since the partition of the country in 1947, 
which ended in war, India and Pakistan fought over Kashmir in 1965 and 1999 
and over the separation of today’s Bangladesh in 1971. The occasional glimmer 
of hope of improved political relations has repeatedly been disappointed. 
Successive governments have negotiated to resolve the outstanding conflicts 
and several issues were at least temporarily solved: like opening of an Indo-
Pakistani bus connection and the Indus Water Treaty, but “the overall 
relationship never improved fundamentally for long” (Malone 2011: 107). 
The unsettled Kashmir conflict, with territorial claims from both India and 
Pakistan as well as calls for autonomy from within Kashmir, has led to an arms 
race that absorbs enormous resources. More recently the war in Afghanistan 
                                                          
9 Manmohan Singh, 30.. 2012.   
http://pmindia.nic.in/speech-details.php?nodeid=1211 (26.03.2013). 
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has spread into Pakistan and Pakistan’s territory serves as a base for terrorism; 
this and the government of India’s engagement in Afghanistan has exacerbated 
the mistrust between the governments in Delhi and Islamabad. Pakistan is not a 
secular state; the government is politically not very stable and more or less 
permanently at the brink of failure. Attacks by Pakistani-based terrorists in 
India (with the major incident in 2008 in Mumbai) are now the major stumbling 
block for improvement of relations. In India the fear is that developments in 
Pakistan could “trigger a wave of political Islam” (Mennon/Kumar 2010: 143) 
with potentially serious consequences for India10 or alternatively leading 
instead to another military coup. The nuclear weapons in Pakistan, which could 
easily fall into the hands of the military, create a high security risk, not only for 
the neighbour India. 
2.3.2 China: Between competition and cooperation 
Sino-Indian relations have immensely fluctuated since the early Jawaharlal 
Nehru period of Hindi cini bhai-bhai (‘Indians and Chinese are brothers’). In 1954 
the two governments signed an agreement, known in India as Panchsheel,11 in 
which they formulated principles of peace and co-existence. But territorial 
disputes (unresolved until today), conflict over China’s occupation of Tibet and 
the war of 1962, in which India suffered a psychologically devastating loss, 
have produced tension and mistrust, alternating with occasional periods of 
closer, more cooperative ties. The period of ideological anti-imperialist 
similarity of the 1950s quickly gave way to the bitter border war, and it took a 
long period until the mid-1970s when cautious steps were undertaken to 
normalise relations (Malone 2011: 129-152). 
Today, the relations between the two countries are shaped by several 
contradictory factors: The still unresolved border disputes remain a source of 
anxiety in India (Bai 2012), as does China’s preferential relationship with 
Pakistan, especially Chinese assistance for Pakistan’s conventional armed forces 
(Mohan 2012: 48). Both countries are increasingly spending on their military, 
but the growth of Chinese military expenditures outpaces India’s by far, as 
figure 1 illustrates.12 At the same time the governments of India and China 
cooperate in such settings as the BRICS initiative as well as the G20.  
 
                                                          
10 In their scenarios for the region Mennon and Kumar (2010) fear a similar 
development in Bangladesh.  
11 From Sanskrit = five principles: (1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial 
integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit 
and (5) peaceful co-existence. See Nehru (1961: 99-102) on the concept of 
Panchsheel. 
12 According to SIPRI (2012), China was the second-largest spender on its 
armed forces in 2011. India ranked 7th, at about the same level as Saudi 
Arabia and Germany. 
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Figure 1: Trend in Military Expenditures in India and China (1996-2011) 
In constant US $ million 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Data Bank.   
http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2011.xls 
(18.02.2013) 
 
Strategists in India observe with great uneasiness China’s approach to invest 
heavily in the modernisation of its naval force and the creation of what is called 
in Indian military circles a ‘string of pearls’, leaving a distinct footprint in 
India’s sphere of interest, including in the Indian Ocean region (Kapoor 2012).13 
Some even see a “deliberate Chinese strategic encirclement of India” 
(Kumar/Kumar 2010: 79). Foreign policy observers advise the government of 
India to invest into becoming “an eminent maritime power” and to observe its 
core maritime interests (Vasan 2012: 416). This is done with the goal of 
containing the Chinese presence by military diplomacy (Jha 2011) and 
investments in its naval forces (Athawale 2012; Parmar 2012).  
Despite the fact that the bilateral trade between China and India has grown 
considerably since when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi normalised the relations 
during a visit to Beijing in 1988, the two countries’ perceived competition has 
intensified. India’s nuclear power status and the ‘nuclear deal’ of 2005 between 
the United States and India are of great concern to China. Particularly the 
antagonisms with Pakistan and the continuing territorial dispute with China 
since the 1962 war have convinced all Indian governments during the last five 
decades to invest heavily into modern equipped armed forces, including a sea-
going naval capacity that includes aircraft carriers. Today, the Indian 
government defines its interest in a broader regional and even global context. 
Despite mutually enforcing political signals from both China and India, the 
                                                          
13 Kapoor is a former Chief of the Army who raises his concerns about China’s 
ambition in the region. 
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interest in Asia and the global ambitions of the two most populous countries of 
the world have turned them into fierce competitors. 
Currently, India is often seen more as a competitor to China in political, 
economic and possibly even military terms beyond the region (‘elephant versus 
dragon’) (Chachavalpongpun 2011: 66-67). In the West, India is considered 
mainly as a potential strategic partner, given its democratic and cultural 
heritage, while China emerges as a dangerous competitor. On the other hand, 
there is also ample scope for cooperation, both in regional and global politics as 
well as in bilateral economic relations. 
2.3.3 The regional environment: India — the reluctant leader 
India’s relations with the smaller neighbouring countries are intricate and 
regional cooperation is small and embryonic. Today, in contrast to many 
regions of the world, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) is not a well-functioning regional organisation. On the contrary, 
SAARC, with its members Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, 
Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, is a volatile conflict area. Of the countries in 
India’s immediate neighbourhood six states (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Myanmar, 
Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) were considered as failed states in 2011 in the 
Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace Failed State Index.14 Political, economic, 
ethnic, religious and territorial tensions haunt the region (Bhattacharjee 2012; 
Nayak 2012; Pattanaik 2012a; Pattanaik 2012b; Dahiya/Behuria 2012). The 
potentially large field of cooperation suffers from the bipolar rivalry and enmity 
between India and Pakistan.  
India’s comparative weight in important indicators illustrates the country’s 
dominance in the region. About three-quarters of the region’s population live in 
India; similarly, the Indian subcontinent makes up over 70% of the territory and 
India contributes 79% of the region’s GDP; the armed forces of India make up 
55% of the total (Destradi 2012: 59) and the country accounts for 81% of military 
expenditures in 2011.15 Because of India’s overwhelming size, its economic and 
military potential, including its nuclear weapons, the neighbours usually 
perceive the Indian government’s regional ambitions with suspicion and 
apprehension. Although South Asian countries have a long common history, 
traditional economic ties and a joint cultural heritage, the size of India (and 
perceived dominance), the insecurity and violence in the region as well as 
differences of political systems result in divergences and controversies over 
political values on questions of regional cooperation or integration. Part of the 
reality is that cooperation often fails due to the existing tensions; the other part 
is that in the past India has not really been a cooperative regional leader.  
                                                          
14 Foreign Policy (2013): Failed States. An Eighth Collaboration between 
Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace.   
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive 
(26.03.2013). 
15 SIPRI military expenditure data bank.   
http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/milex (18.02.2013). 
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India’s technical cooperation and aid program is of recent origin and still not 
very large but has risen by over 160% between the financial years 2006-07 and 
2011-12 (Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs 2007: 177; 
Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs 2012: 209). The bulk of its aid 
goes to countries within the region as table 1 indicates. 
 
Table 1: Principal Destinations of India's Technical Cooperation Programs 
(2011-2012) 
Technical Cooperation Budget (InRupees crore*) Percentage of India's Total Aid 
& Loan Budget  
          InR crore*               % 
1. Bhutan 2030.00 59.31 
2. Afghanistan 280.00 8.47 
3. Maldives 273.00 7.98 
4. Nepal 150.00 4.38 
5. African Countries   124.00 3.62 
6. Sri Lanka 133.00 3.89 
7. Myanmar 111.82 3.27 
8. Eurasian Countries 30.00 0.88 
9. Bangladesh 8.00 0.23 
10. Latin American Countries 0.50 0.01 
11. Mongolia 2.00 0.06 
12. Others 270.55 7.90 
Total 3422.87 100 
* one crore = 10 Million, 1 crore InR = US $184,000 (2012) 
Source: Government of India. Ministry of External Affairs (2012): 209. 
 
Both India’s unsteady and sporadic diplomatic efforts and political actions 
which have had fluctuating priorities on the importance of the neighbourhood, 
plus the sheer geopolitical size of India have “given rise to negative perceptions 
about India as a selﬁsh hegemon, seeking to maximise its power at the cost of 
others in the neighbourhood“ (Behuria/Pattanaik/Gupta 2012: 231). 
India does not only have security concerns abroad but faces also a few 
pressing security challenges at home: left-wing insurgencies of the Naxalites 
(Maoists–Communist Party India); Islamist extremism and terrorism (partly 
connected to Pakistan); and ethnically and religiously based political 
fundamentalism and militancy (Kumar/Kumar 2010: 17). The reasons for 
internal unrest are manifold: among them is the poor role of the state in 
providing basic services, the security forces’ protracted and brutal suppression 
of the Naxalite violence and human rights abuses and the counter strategies of 
the state (Khilani et al. 2012: 43-49). Some of the security threats are closely 
connected to the contradictory political and economic developments in the 
society that have created the ‘two Indias’ of rich and poor, developed and 
underdeveloped which act as destabilisers, producing enormous friction and 
Herbert Wulf 
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conflict and resistance by opposing groups (Sahni 2012: 2). Many of the Indian 
states are affected. 
3. India’s Foreign Policy Practices and 
Concepts: From Non-Alignment via Hindu 
Nationalism to a Global Role 
India’s foreign policy has experienced several phases since the country gained 
independence in 1947. They range from the early idealism during the Nehru 
years to today’s liberal and neo-liberal economic ideas. The underlying values 
and the ideological foundations of India’s foreign policy are partly overlapping, 
and partly contradictory. I have delineated the strands that have been dominant 
in India’s various governments’ policies at different times.16 An overview of the 
chronology of Indian foreign policy and the conceptual and ideological basis is 
summarised in table 2.  
Four broad concepts of foreign policy approaches can be distinguished: 
First, the idealists,17 most prominently represented by India’s first Prime 
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, want India to be an independent, non-aligned actor 
that could also serve as a facilitator of disarmament and global peace. They 
emphasise the uniqueness of India and want the Indian government to perform 
foreign policy on a moral basis, in a principled fashion, and to set an example.  
Second, the realists18 that have been prominent in government at different 
times strongly emphasise geopolitics and want to increase India’s economic and 
military weight in the region and more recently at the global level. Not 
surprisingly, security and conflict, the issue par excellence of realism, is high on 
the agenda of the realists in India, today as in previous periods when realism 
was the dominant concept. 
Third, the Hindu nationalists governed only from 1998 to 2004, but their 
ideology is much older and predates Indian independence. They yearn to make 
India strong in military and economic terms to defend and be proud of Hindu 
civilisation. Hindu nationalist do not shy away from alienating non-Hindu 
communities in India and in neighbouring countries. Possibly, during the 
period of economic liberalisation of the last two decades, which was interrupted 
by a Hindu nationalist government, the neo-liberals underestimated the 
                                                          
16 This section is inspired by Sagar (2009). 
17 Idealism in international relations dates back to the period between World 
Wars I and II. Proponents of this school of thought wanted to overcome the 
classical ’balance of power’ system and instead opted for a system of 
collective security. It was particularly proposed by Woodrow Wilson.  
18 This school of thought is represented by such authors as the British historian 
E. H. Carr and the American thinker Hans J. Morgenthau. 
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potency of nationalism in India which is at the core of Hindu nationalists’ 
concept. 
Fourth, the internationalists and liberals (or more precisely: neo-liberals who 
focus on economics both domestically and in their foreign policy approach) 
started to dominate politically in India with the economic liberalisation at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Genuine liberals see the source of power in the world in 
the authority of values and economic strength and seek freedom, development, 
prosperity and peace through increasing economic interdependence. A complex 
network of relations would clearly exceed the conventional Westphalian nation 
state system (Keohane/Nye: 1977). In contrast, the concept applied in India is 
akin to neo-liberal economic thoughts (of deregulation of the economy). Their 
emphasis is on strengthening India’s global role in the concert of nations and at 
the same time its military power. 
Three of these four concepts (idealism, realism and liberalism) are based on 
ideas and terms prominently used in international relations theory. However, I 
do not strictly follow the concepts of international relations theory that 
emphasise realism, liberalism and constructivism as the dominant and most 
popular notions. None of these three terms constitutes a homogenous school of 
thought. On the contrary, all three have been refined and criticised and a host of 
terms and subcategories have been added, such as neo-realism, neo-liberalism, 
post-liberalism, structuralism and post-structuralism, post-modernism etc. My 
aim is to broadly classify how the various Indian governments have focused on 
certain conceptual ideas, without, however, claiming that they have pursued 
these concepts in pure form.  
A common denominator of all these four concepts (including Hindu 
nationalism) and the various Indian governments implementing them is that 
they are state-centric, which is so typical for the classical realists’ school. In that 
sense the strong current of Indian foreign policy can well be described — with 
the exception of Hindu nationalism — by ‘positivist/rationalist’ theories. The 
Hindu nationalists’ position is based on ideology rather than rationality. During 
the most recent era of Indian foreign policy non-state economic actors (business, 
trade, and investors) have played a role in Indian foreign policy considerations 
as well.19 In parallel to the expansion of actors, the agenda of issues is gradually 
being widened, in as far as economics plays an increasing role in Indian foreign 
policy. But today’s foreign policy does not focus on ‘post-positivist’ reflections 
that incorporate other meanings of security (like human security, environ-
mental security etc.), except for economic security. In other areas, particularly in 
global negotiations on climate change and other environmental issues, the 
government of India continues to be caught up in the classical North-South 
controversies. 
                                                          
19 This policy is very much along the lines described in the seminal work of 
Robert Gilpin (within the realist school) who argued that differential 
economic growth rates among nations are an important explanation for the 
rise of great powers (Gilpin 1981). 
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3.1 Nehru’s Idealism: Non-aligned and Exemplary 
India‘s first Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs, Jawaharlal Nehru, 
was the architect of a foreign policy strongly stressing Indian autonomy and 
independence. Nehru emphasised his distaste for the great power blocs:  
“What does joining a bloc mean? After all it can only mean one thing: give up your view 
about a particular question, adopt the other party’s view on that question in order to please 
it and gain its favour” (Nehru 1961: 36).  
He was a politician with a modernist background and approach, but had a 
sceptical view of the United States and was more attracted by the Soviet 
Union’s anti-colonial and anti-imperialist policies. His own socialist notions and 
his admiration for the economic progress of the Soviet Union influenced the 
economic and industrial policy of India during the 1950s and beyond. Still, he 
wanted to keep at a distance from the big powers and shape international 
relations by emphasising India’s uniqueness:  
“India is too big a country herself to be bound down to any country, however big it may be. 
India is going to be and is bound to be a country that counts in world affairs, not I hope in 
the military sense, but in many other senses which are more important and effective in the 
end” (Nehru 1961: 47).  
By that he meant the persuasion and strength of values and ideas.  
At the same time he stressed the need to cooperate among the Asian and 
other developing countries. The Non-aligned Movement, which was favoured 
and shaped by Nehru, was — in his understanding — not a rival bloc but “an 
experiment in co-existence, for the countries of Asia and Africa” (Nehru 1961: 
70). Non-alignment became a distinguishing mark of India’s foreign policy and 
an effort to shape the international order to both overcome the military blocs 
and underline India’s quest for leadership in the world. Nehru strongly 
believed that “a deliberate policy of friendship with other countries goes farther 
in gaining security than almost anything else” (Nehru 1961: 79).20 
But Nehru’s internationalist foreign policy and India’s friendship with 
China, a cornerstone of Indian foreign policy during the 1950s, experienced a 
crisis as it “left India utterly unprepared to cope with a serious security threat 
from China and culminated in a disastrous border war in 1962” (Haokip 2011: 
230). Nehru was strongly criticised for his soft foreign policy approach, but he 
countered before the outbreak of the war: “ […] (O)ur foreign policy is as firm 
as rock and it will remain so. The present Government will hold to non-
alignment because it is a matter of principle, not of opportunism or the 
convenience of the day” (Nehru 1961: 348). But the military defeat in the 1962 
India-China war resulted in a trauma that is still palpable today when Indian 
foreign policy gurus analyse Sino-Indian relations. 
The idealist notions of foreign policy with a strong preference for moralist 
ideas are based on the conception that India should be independent and serve 
                                                          
20 At the 1955 Bandung conference, the ‘mid-wife’ of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, the five principles of co-existence (Panchsheel), referred to 
above, were also adopted. 
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as an example by setting standards for peaceful behaviour. The basis for such 
an approach can be found in India’s non-violent freedom movement. Mahatma 
Gandhi and the leaders of the Indian National Congress were fighting against 
colonialism and for India’s independence, for the noble cause of the dignity and 
freedom of India’s citizens by satyagraha, non-violent or civil resistance. Nehru 
asked:  
“What are we interested in world affairs for? We seek no domination over any country. We 
do not wish to interfere in the affairs of any country, domestic or other. Our main stake in 
world affairs is peace, to see that there is racial equality and that people who are still 
subjugated should be free” (Nehru 1961: 39).  
He was not against building up the Indian armed forces but did not want to 
spend too many resources on the military. He detested military-based power 
politics and asserted in a speech in Parliament in 1956:  
“I am not saying that the military approach can be given up in this world. I am not 
speaking like a pacifist. But I submit that thinking of the world’s problems in terms of 
military power and trying to solve them only in terms of military power are doomed to 
failure and have failed” (Nehru 1961: 96).  
This idealistic foreign policy concept rested on the successful Indian freedom 
movement’s non-violent civil disobedient experience, which had led to the 
expulsion of the British colonial masters.  
His approach was profoundly different from the notion of power politics or 
the gunboat diplomacy of the time of imperialism and colonialism. Nehru’s 
policy of independence, his aversion against military blocs, his concept of 
brotherhood among underdeveloped countries, and his drive for the creation of 
the Non-Aligned Movement were the counter-example to the West’s politics of 
dominance as well as the East-West military bloc politics.  
Nehru’s policy was  
“a balanced blend of idealism and enlightened self-interest […] marked by autonomy and 
independence in strategic decision-making, preference for democratic socialism, 
strengthening of defence without compromising on the principles of non-alignment, and 
universal nuclear disarmament as a means to world peace […]” (Behuria/Pattanaik/Gupta 
2012: 233-234). These ideals transformed domestically into the ambition to create a 
democratic and secular state and eradicate poverty.  
The idealist foreign policy was not restricted to the Nehru years (as indicated in 
table 2). In 1996 the Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister, Inder Kumar 
Gujral, announced in a speech in London what became known as ‘Gujral 
Doctrine’. The doctrine emphasises less the moral high ground, so typical for 
the Nehru era, but tries to improve the poor relationship with the countries in 
the region by providing unilateral concessions. It is composed of five points: 
First, India does not insist on reciprocity with the smaller neighbours “but gives 
and accommodates what it can in good faith and trust.”21 Second, no South 
Asian country should allow its territory to be used against the interest of other 
countries in the region. Third, no interference in the internal affairs of others. 
                                                          
21 Text of the speech by I. K Gujral, Prime Minister “Aspects of India’s Foreign 
Policy” at Colombo, Sri Lanka 20.01.1997.  
http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/the-gujral-doctrine/ (26.03.2013). 
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Fourth, respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other countries. 
Fifth, settlement of disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations (Malone 
2011: 326). While these policy announcements were made in good faith, the 
reality of conflicts in the region prevented a substantial improvement of the 
complicated neighbourhood relations. In the words of Bhashin: The doctrine 
“proved to be too mild in the face of the impregnable perceptual framework of 
India’s neighbours” (Bhashin 2008: 13). 
Some of this idealism and moralists’ approach can still be found in 
contemporary Indian foreign policy, namely the “desire to act in a principled 
fashion […]” and “argumentative diplomacy” (Sagar 2009: 805). The wish to act 
in a ‘principled fashion’ in foreign policy becomes apparent when international 
regimes seem to undermine the interest of developing countries. For example: 
“[…] India views proposals by developed countries for mandatory universal 
caps on greenhouse gas emission as ‘green imperialism’” (Sagar 2009: 805). 
3.2 Realism and Geopolitics: Strengthening Economic and 
Military Capabilities 
For realists economic strength and military force is the ultima ratio in the concert 
and competition of nations, and it is the power that largely determines 
international relations. Realist and neo-realist models have emphasised both 
military power and economic strength as defining characteristics of state 
capabilities in the international arena to exploit opportunities and to collect 
gains for the country. In the matrix on the concepts and eras of Indian foreign 
policy (table 2) I delineated three periods with explicit policies or at least 
tendencies towards realist concepts and geopolitical policies. The first period 
under Indira and Rajiv Gandhi was clearly based on assertive politics, 
particularly with regard to neighbouring countries. The second phase (with the 
so-called ‘Look East’ policy) and the third phase of today are a mixture of neo-
liberal economic policies with an Asian and today with a global focus. At the 
same time there are strong tendencies to emphasise the strength of India’s 
military and economic power. 
3.2.1 Soviet friendship and assertive politics 
India’s foreign policy concept underwent substantial changes under Nehru’s 
successors (Lal Bahadur Shastri, 1964–66; Indira Gandhi, 1966–77 and 1980–84; 
and Rajiv Gandhi, 1984–89), which can be described as a transformation from 
idealism towards realism. Realist approaches of foreign policy in India came to 
the fore under Indira Gandhi’s premiership when she pursued an assertive, 
power-oriented policy vis-à-vis India’s neighbours. Among the changes, a 
higher priority than before was given to the size, strength and modernisation of 
the Indian armed forces. 
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Figure 2: Military Expenditure (Billion Rs., during Indira Gandi’s terms in 
office) 
Source: SIPRI Yearbooks (several) and SIPRI Military Expenditure Data Bank 
 
A number of unrelated political factors have facilitated the intensification of 
relations between the Soviet Union and India. Their economic cooperation 
helped to weave a close net of bilateral economic relations. Bilateral trade 
increased and India imported technology from the Soviet Union, including 
military technology (Wulf 1979). The split between the Soviet Union and China 
made it more or less natural for the Indian government to re-orientate its 
foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. India’s foreign policy, with the 
priority on non-alignment and independence, was not formally given up, but 
the ties between India and the Soviet Union grew stronger, despite existing 
ideological differences.  
The Bangladesh War in 1971, a result of an internal crisis in Pakistan, 
worsened the relations between India and the United States (Malone 2011: 160-
161). The US government tried to put pressure on the Indian government not to 
support the liberation movement in East Pakistan (Bangladesh). As a reaction to 
and as a result of the US military assistance to Pakistan, the governments of 
India and the Soviet Union signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship 
and Cooperation in August 1971. This treaty, just short of a formal military 
alliance, was a clear departure from the non-alignment policy that had guided 
more than two decades of Indian foreign policy.  
It was a fundamental shift to what is often called realpolitik from the value-
based foreign policy that Indira Gandhi’s father Jawaharlal Nehru had 
preached and practised. The military intervention in Bangladesh, a proactive 
measure to stop the inflow of refugees from East Pakistan in the same year, was 
a sign of the government’s willingness to use the armed forces for settling 
conflicts. As early as 1967, during her first period as Prime Minister, Indira 
Gandhi authorised the development of nuclear weapons as a reaction to China’s 
nuclear test program, leading to the first nuclear test in India in 1974. The 
period of Indira Ghandi’s government was “characterized by lip service to anti-
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imperialism, Third World solidarity, and non-alignment abroad […]. However 
[…] there was a marked drift in practice towards power politics […]” (Malone 
2011: 50-51). 
Rajiv Gandhi, Indira Gandhi’s son who succeeded her after her 
assassination, also practised her assertive style. In the 1980s, during a crisis and 
civil war in Sri Lanka, Indian troops intervened between 1987 and 1990 in the 
conflict. Rajiv Gandhi pushed through an accord with the Sri Lankan 
government to enable the Indian armed forces to stop the refugee flow into 
India and to disarm the insurgents. The aim to enforce peace in this civil war 
was not achieved and the military operation was an important factor that led to 
the ousting of the Rajiv Gandhi-led Congress (I) government in 1989 and to 
Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in 1991. The successor government began 
withdrawing Indian troops in 1989. 
3.2.2 ‘Look East’ 
The end of the Cold War required another turn-around of foreign policy or, 
more positively, it gave India the freedom “to reinvent its foreign policy” 
(Mohan 2006: 19). What turned out to be the start of a new and thriving foreign 
policy period was at the time actually a collapse of the most important 
parameters of India’s foreign affairs. “The collapse of its only real strategic 
partner during the Cold War, the Soviet Union, forced New Delhi to start 
rebuilding its great-power relations from scratch” (Mohan 2012: 29).  
The so-called ‘Look East’ policy was an outcome of an entirely changed 
world. In 1992 Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao initiated a strategic shift in 
the government’s perspective of the world. He focused India’s foreign policy 
after the end of the bipolarity and the demise of the Soviet Union on the 
neighbourhood in Asia (Malone 2011: 202-223; Gaur 2011). The intention was to 
strengthen the political, economic and also military ties in the wider region in a 
multipolar world.  
A certain realist disposition, perhaps a mixture of realist and internationalist 
positions, was and is India’s ‘Look East’ policy which combines ambitions of 
regionalism and a more general Asian outlook (Mishra 2011). The ‘Look East’ 
policy is certainly less idealistic than the Nehru-dominated foreign policy of 
India with the emphasis on values, but it is also much less assertive than Indira 
Gandhi’s approach. Thus it has been called “cautious Realpolitik” 
(Chachavalpongpun 2011: 59). This policy shift was not accompanied by a 
declaration of an official doctrinal definition. The ‘Look East’ policy was a new 
approach to foreign, security and trade policy with Asian countries in the focus. 
A former Indian Ambassador, Ranjit Gupta, enumerates in hindsight the 
reasons for India’s precarious situation in the post-Nehru and post-Gandhi era 
and the need to formulate a new foreign policy outlook:  
“The dynamics of Cold War politics and India’s insular economic policies ensured that 
India had marginalised itself from the international mainstream. India never conceived a 
long term strategic vision of its future beyond being the leader and spokesman of the 
emerging Third World; this gave India very considerable international prestige and 
influence but started waning from 1955 or so and after 1962 went into free fall. Thus, India 
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progressively lost clout even within the Third World while ensuring a poor relationship 
with the powerful Western World” (Gupta 2011: 12). 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh confirmed the extraordinary swing of this 
foreign policy move:  
“This was not merely an external economic policy, it was also a strategic shift in India’s 
vision of the world and India’s place in the evolving global economy. Most of all it was 
about reaching out to our civilizational Asian neighbours in the region” (quoted by Gupta 
2011: 13). 
Asian countries, particularly the ASEAN countries, have experienced 
exceptional economic development. It was therefore plausible for Indian policy 
makers to look towards the east in trying to adjust its foreign policy and foreign 
trade outlook. Actually, India’s former Ambassador to China, C. V. 
Ranganathan, points out that the ‘Look East’ policy was “really an attempt at 
restoring in a modern context India’s traditional age old links in commerce, 
ideas and culture with a vast populated region with which India has 
historically, socially, culturally enjoyed close contacts” (Ranganathan 2011: 9-
10).  
Since the initiation of the ‘Look East’ concept India’s involvement in several 
Asian regional multilateral forums has intensified and India has started a 
campaign of diplomatic initiatives, including military cooperation. Naval visits, 
joint manoeuvres, military training assistance, joint weapon development and 
production are intended to strengthen the ‘Look East’ policy as well as “to 
balance China’s influence in the Indian Ocean region (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Myanmar etc.) and in western South Asia” (Jha 2011: 49). 
India’s foreign trade with Asian countries, particularly the Indo-ASEAN 
trade and the trade with the Middle East (West Asia in Indian government 
terminology) grew over-proportionally (see Figure 3). Largely due to India’s 
policy and trade focus on ASEAN as well as its energy imports from Middle 
Eastern countries, these countries alone accounted for 30% of all Indian exports 
and 37% of its imports in 2011-12. These percentages stood at only 18% and 11% 
respectively in 1996-97. The trade with China experienced a similar growth 
(Government of India, Department of Commerce and Industry 2012).  
  
India’s Aspirations in Global Politics 
 
23 
 
Figure 3: Foreign Trade of India 
 
Exports in billion US $ 
 
 
Imports in billion US $ 
 
Source: Government of India, Department of Commerce and Industry. 
http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/irgnq.asp (26.03.2013). 
 
As envisioned by the ‘Look East’ policy, the relations with the Asian neighbours 
became the backbone of India’s foreign policy as well as foreign trade. The 
geographical proximity with the Asian neighbours, the presence of a large 
Indian origin population and Indian diasporas in many countries and the fast-
growing Asian markets provided a rationale for the new policy thrust (Haokip 
2011: 231).  
3.2.3 Today’s geopolitical outlook 
Geopolitical perceptions and strategies are suggested in recent years, both to 
clearly show no sign of weakness towards China and to underline India’s 
ambition for a more global role and for a part in global norm- and rule-making 
(Kumar/Kumar 2010: 28). Prioritising such strategies leads to the desire to 
promote India’s economy and to strengthen and modernise military capacities. 
Raja C. Mohan, the doyen of strategic debate on Indian foreign policy, 
concludes:  
“Two decades after India launched reforms to promote economic globalisation, the rapid 
improvement in its relative economic weight in the region, its growing trade volumes, more 
intensive regional diplomacy, and an expanded military diplomacy have made India a 
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noteworthy actor on regional security in different parts of Asia and the Indian Ocean 
littoral” (Mohan 2012: 42). 
Strategists and high-ranking officers of the armed forces suggest that the 
attention regarding the armed forces should be directed towards naval 
capacities and on strengthening India’s nuclear capabilities. Arun Prakash, a 
retired Admiral, wants to bolster India’s pre-eminent maritime power in the 
Indian Ocean for “sustained operations in our area of interest, including power 
projection” (quoted by Singh 2012: 8). Abhijit Singh, a researcher at the National 
Maritime Foundation in New Delhi, suggests taking the Chinese navy as an 
example: “which is in the nascent stages of becoming an expeditionary force” 
(Singh 2012: 8).  
Rajiv Kumar, the former Chief Economist of the Confederation of Indian 
Industry and Santosh Kumar, a former Ambassador, (2010: 15, 79) are quite 
outspoken and state that India needs a blue water navy in the Indian Ocean, 
and a nuclear triad with thermonuclear warheads and intercontinental ballistic 
missiles. Others come to similar conclusions: “India’s maritime strategy, if 
pursued with vigour, could give it considerable strategic advantage in Asia” 
(Khilnani et al. 2012: 12) and “(w)e should be in a position to dominate the 
Indian Ocean region” (Khilnani et al. 2012: 41). Strengthening nuclear 
capabilities is an unquestioned strategy in almost all of India’s political 
quarters; there exist hardly any reservations. The assumption is “that nuclear 
weaponry will remain a permanent feature of international politics and an 
integral element of Indian security for several decades” (Singh 2011: 61), but the 
government “should be ready for disarmament if other nuclear powers do so” 
(Khilnani et al. 2012: 56). Unabashedly, Z. D. Singh, a research fellow at the 
New Delhi Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, requests that  
“Indian diplomats need to ensure that India’s de facto nuclear weapon status is reflected in 
future adjustments to the global non-proliferation and strategic arms control systems to 
enable India to ultimately acquire rule-making powers as a de jure partner in the global 
nuclear system. At home, resources would be better spent by investing in assured second-
strike capabilities to deter present and future adversaries” (Singh 2011: 62). 
How should the Indian government respond to the grand global power shifts 
with both the United States and China claiming a stake in Asia-Pacific policies? 
Policy recommendations fluctuate between strong efforts towards autonomous 
military- and economically-based geopolitics and more internationalist 
positions like “building robust political and economic links with both China 
and the U.S.” (Mohan 2012: 46). It seems that there is absolutely no 
disagreement among the Indian foreign policy professionals that India needs to 
strengthen its military capabilities (Dahiya 2012) and to build up “competitive 
coercive capabilities […] to exercise a level of influence […] while dissuading 
extra regional actors form pursuing unilateral agendas” (Singh 2011: 58). 
3.3 Hindu Nationalism: Independent and Strong 
The sharpest critique, actually the counter strategy, to the idealist foreign policy 
vision is the Hindu nationalist view. In contrast to the Nehru period, when 
India achieved a status as an important leader among the countries of the 
developing world, primarily by emphasising the moral high ground in foreign 
affairs, the governments in the 1980s and 1990s were no longer convinced of the 
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“moral uniqueness” of the country (Malone 2011: 52). Too many economic and 
political failures had destroyed the dream of India as a shining example in the 
world: the malfunction of the economy and the continuing underdevelopment 
and poverty, the wars with China and Pakistan and conflicts with other 
neighbours as well as the authoritarian measures against democratic freedom 
under Indira Gandhi when she declared a ‘state of emergency’ in order to rule 
by decree.  
During the years 1998-2004 the central government was formed by a 
coalition called the National Democratic Alliance, headed by Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee, a member of the Hindu nationalist party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). 
After victories in the first half of the 1990s in several state elections (Gujarat, 
Maharashtra and Karnataka) the BJP was also recognised as an important 
national party. The National Democratic Alliance tried to put into practice what 
their ideologues had been preaching for decades. As early as in their 1991 
election manifesto they rejected the relevance of non-alignment and 
unambiguously promoted the Hindutva-based, Hindu identity, nation-building 
strategy and a tough line against Pakistan (Gosh 1994: 810-12). In contrast to the 
concept of non-alignment, international cooperation, good-neighbourly 
relations and peaceful settlement of conflicts, the ambition of Hindu 
nationalism is to make India a strong and independent country that does not 
need to be afraid of any rival.  
The most comprehensive and influential societal concept of the nationalist 
ideology is the Hindutva manifest by Vinayak Damodar Savakar written in 1923. 
He proposed creating an Indian nation based on its heritage and identity that is 
strong enough to defend its independence (swaraj) in the international 
competition. To achieve this, it would be essential, according to Savakar, to 
create a homogenous Hindu society that excludes all heterogeneous elements 
(Wolf/Schultens 2009: 167). Neither Buddhism, nor Sikhism nor Islam has a 
place in such a society. Particularly the Buddhist concepts of spiritual 
brotherhood, “meal-mouthed formulas” according to the Hindutva strategist 
Savarkar, have led to “invasions from Central Asia around ad 500 and brought 
the so-called Hindu Golden Age to an end” (Sagar 2009: 807, paraphrasing 
Savarkar).  
The National Democratic Alliance with its nationalist ideology had pledged 
to make India a power centre of the world that would no longer bend under the 
pressure from neighbouring countries or big powers (Behuria/Pattanaik/Gupta 
2012: 238-239). The rise of political Hinduism had already become an important 
factor in religious conflicts between Muslims and Hindus before the BJP came 
to power (Malone 2011: 52).  
The BJP and its alliance were serious about strengthening India’s military 
capabilities. In May 1998, only a few weeks after the inauguration of the new 
government, the Indian nuclear experts tested five nuclear devices. While the 
technological preparation had already been done long before the Hindu 
nationalists came to power, the government gave the green light for going 
overtly nuclear, a political act that provoked many governments in the world 
who had unsuccessfully tried for years to convince India to join the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty. Two days later Prime Minister Vajpayee declared “India is now a 
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nuclear weapons state” (quoted by Kundu 2004: 9). Reactions from Pakistan did 
not take much time. Two months after the Indian test, Pakistan tested six 
nuclear devices and declared itself a nuclear power. 
After the government failed to win a vote of confidence in Parliament in 
April 1999, general elections had to be held in October 1999 since the opposition 
led by the Congress Party was not able to form a new government. Together 
with a regional party the BJP and coalition parties secured a large majority in 
parliament. Four factors were decisive: First, the so-called Kargil War of 1999 
between India and Pakistan increased the popularity of the BJP. Second, Sonia 
Gandhi, the Italian-born wife of the late Rajiv Gandhi, challenged the BJP. The 
issue of Gandhi’s foreign origin led to a discussion and conflict on videsi 
(foreign) versus swadeshi (home-grown, self-reliance) within the Congress Party 
on which the BJP could capitalise. Third, the BJP had started at the local level 
and was able to serve local and regional demands by aligning with other 
regionally-based parties in several federal states. Fourth, in contrast to its 
Hinduism focus in domestic social and political policies, and to the surprise of 
many political observers, the BJP subscribed fully to the economic liberalisation 
policies that the previous government had initiated under Manmohan Singh, 
then Finance Minister. This is insofar interesting since the rightist government 
favoured swadeshi. Swadeshi was originally an economic strategy of the Indian 
independence movement, boycotting British products with the intention of 
removing the British colonial power. Since economic growth and the economic 
liberalisation policies were popular domestically, the BJP subscribed to the 
economic liberalisation policy.  
In concrete foreign policy actions the NDA government spent most of its 
energies on changing India’s foreign relations with Pakistan 
(Behuria/Pattanaik/Gupta 2012: 238-239). The Prime Minister inaugurated the 
famous bus service between the Indian capital Delhi and the Pakistani town 
Lahore. However, the Hindu-nationalist domestic and foreign policy did not 
really match. Not surprisingly, foreign policy relations to the neighbouring 
Muslim-majority states of Bangladesh and Pakistan did not improve. This 
concept, fixated exclusively on Hinduism, is not in congruence with other 
fundamental beliefs and ambitions of the BJP. There is, as Partha S. Ghosh has 
already pointed out before the BJP actually formed a government,  
“an inherent contradiction in the BJP’s Hindutva stance and its Pakistan policy. An 
avowedly Hindu chauvinistic India left little room for any emotional integration of Sikh-
majority Punjab and Muslim-majority Kashmir into the Indian Union” (Ghosh 1994: 813).   
The domestically popular Hindu chauvinist policy clashed with foreign policy 
realities. And domestically, over the last three decades, Upadhyay and 
Robinson soberly conclude, “Hindu communalism has been deepening and 
growing. In fact, it has transformed into fundamentalism” 
(Upadhyay/Robinson 2012: 52). 
The emphasis on military strength by the Hindu nationalists resembles some 
of the realist concepts. While realists pursue a rational, though power-based 
policy, Hindu nationalism has a strong ideological underpinning and is based 
on exclusion of non-Hindus. Hindu nationalists are, according to Sagar  
“driven by contradictory impulses of pride and shame: pride in what they consider the self-
evident importance of Indian civilisation, and shame at its past subjugation by Muslim and 
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British invaders, and at its continuing weak response to security threats. From this potent 
mix of motives comes a burning desire to resurrect the glory of India and to prevent the 
recurrence of humiliation” (Sagar 2009: 806). 
3.4 Value-oriented Liberal Internationalism and Neo-liberal 
Economics and Pragmatism 
The early 1990s were not only a turning point on a global scale with the end of 
the bipolar world, it was also the beginning of a more global outlook in India’s 
foreign as well as economic policies, also classified as an ‘era of pragmatism’ 
(Malone 2011: 51). Two periods are mentioned under this category in the matrix 
on foreign policy (table 2): the ‘Look East’ policy during the 1990s with the 
focus on Asia and the period of economic liberalisation under Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh after the end of the Hindu nationalist government with a 
more global focus.  
The ‘Look East’ policy, initiated at the same time and in parallel to the 
economic liberalisation, was in line with both the economic liberalisation policy 
and the broader more globally oriented foreign policy approach. The economic 
liberalisation policy pre-dated the Hindu nationalist government and was 
continued after its termination. When India faced an economic crisis at the end 
of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s the government introduced reforms to 
liberalise the economy. India faced a serious balance of payment crisis in 1991, 
with the government close to default. This financial crisis was partly due to 
growing energy import bills resulting in large trade and fiscal deficits that 
affected the entire economy. At the same time, India faced the loss of its former 
prime political and economic partner, the Soviet Union.  
Until the introduction of liberalisation reforms key features of Indian 
economic policy had been protection of the domestic industry, import 
substitution, state-supported industrialisation, nationalisation of key industries, 
central planning in five-year plans, a complex license system and bureaucratic 
regulations, often referred to as license raj, indicating the elaborate state 
planning and red tape. The economic reform policies included some of the 
typical neo-liberal deregulation features that were popular in other parts of the 
world at the time, like giving up the fixed exchange rate system for the national 
currency, divesting some of the state enterprises and privatisation of industries, 
tax reforms etc. as well as opening up of the economy for foreign direct 
investments in India as well as enabling Indian big business to go global. Some 
economic changes requested by the IMF, however, like cuts of agricultural 
subsidies, were not addressed by the reform measures. 
Measured in growth performance of overall GDP, the liberalisation of the 
economy was quite successful. Between 1950 and 1980, annual GDP growth 
fluctuated between 2 and 4 %, at times below the population growth. The 
economic growth rate picked up during the 1980s and the Reserve Bank of 
India reported an annual average growth of 5.5 % for the period 1980-85 and 5.7 
% for 1985-1990. The rate of growth increased substantially from that level after 
2002, reaching almost 10% during the last few years before the global financial 
crisis began to affect the Indian economy. The peak was reached in 2005 to 2008 
(Reserve Bank of India 2011). With these rates, India became one of the fastest-
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growing economies in the world. This is probably the most important single 
reason for the Indian government and foreign policy strategists to rethink 
India’s global standing. 
Liberals argue that economic interdependence of nations and groups of 
nations is not only beneficial for the economy but is also likely to increase 
security and reduce the probability of war among states. In contrast to the 
realists who stress power, liberals focus on interdependence and the 
pervasiveness of democratic institutions. 
In India, the close relationship between internationalism and idealism is 
probably most clearly encapsulated in Nehru’s personality and foreign policy. 
He was both a moralist and favoured peaceful international cooperation. 
However, those politicians and economists who initiated the liberalisation of 
the Indian economy at the beginning of the 1990s did not primarily look at the 
liberal argument of the positive effects of interdependence. They were 
disillusioned and disappointed with the Nehruvian vision of an exemplary 
peaceful India as well as with the assertive policies of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi. 
They were frustrated about India’s economic and social development. India’s 
early foreign policies, which were based on moral principles, were no longer 
appropriate tools to place India among the big global players, nor did the Soviet 
style economic planning model have any attraction left.  
India’s quest for autonomy and its non-aligned foreign policy have partly 
been perceived as disengagement, as a barrier to international co-operation. Its 
focus on the Non-Aligned Movement and its Third World solidarity “provided 
little material benefit and fostered a confrontational attitude vis-à-vis the West” 
(Sagar 2009: 813). 
Nevertheless, after more than two decades of neo-liberal economic policies 
has India reached a stage in which some of the political Nehruvian 
internationalist ideas (rather than the moral prestige) are again updated but 
without the narrowness of the anti-West developing world outlook. Behuria, 
Pattanaik and Gupta conclude: “The neo-liberal emphasis on building mutual 
economic interdependencies has become the hallmark of India’s foreign policy” 
(Behuria/Pattanaik/Gupta 2012: 240). 
Amidst the neo-liberals (and the realists) there are also occasionally 
advocates for a more moral prestige-based policy. The group of distinguished 
experts who want to shape India’s global position with the ’Nonalignment 2.0’ 
concept believe: “The fundamental source of India’s power in the world is 
going to be the power of its example” (Khilnani et al. 2012: 7), if the government 
does its homework and starts a sustainable development process.  
With the economic liberalisation reforms, the government threw over board 
many constraints, enabling India as a rising power “to take its rightful position 
on the world stage” (Mohan 2012: 27). The optimistic perspective among 
liberals is to have “an enormous economic footprint” despite being “a poor and 
developing country” (Khilnani et al. 2012: 31). India’s value system, its 
“exceptionalism” (Stuenckel 2012: 35) and stable democratic institutions amid 
poverty and inequality, forms policy makers’ view of the globalised world. 
India’s economic power will give it the prospect for better and mutually 
beneficial relations with its neighbours. However, liberalisation in India has 
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largely been understood as neo-liberal deregulation of the economy (Wankhede 
2012: 41).  
Not directly related to the liberalisation policy and the growth of the Indian 
economy, but at the height of the economic boom, there emerged chance 
emerged to improve relations with the United States, something which was 
important for India’s foreign policy and its global aspirations. The ‘nuclear deal’ 
of 2005, as it came to be called, made between the USA and India ended a three-
decade nuclear trade moratorium, giving India access to non-military nuclear 
technology and resulting in unprecedented progress of US-Indian foreign 
relations (Bajoria/Plan 2010). This Indo-US rapprochement was possible despite 
the continued push for advancing India’s nuclear weapon program. The US 
government under President Bush (junior) viewed India as a rising power that 
could help, on the side of the US, to shape the balance of power in Asia. In the 
small strategic community in New Delhi this agreement and the autonomous 
developments in nuclear technology are seen as a stepping-stone for India’s 
enhanced global role and a strong partnership with the United States, 
particularly regarding its security concerns in the region (Mohan 2012: 46; 
Purushothaman 2012 on present US-India defence relations).  
Nuclear weapons policy is an issue which is largely uncontroversial in India 
but contested abroad. India’s use of idealist and moralist arguments in foreign 
policy create a dilemma — if not hypocrisy. Various governments in India have 
emphasised the discriminatory nature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
and all Indian governments have refused to give in to pressure to join the 
treaty. The NPT is seen as ‘nuclear apartheid’ since it treats the nuclear ‘haves’ 
and ‘have-nots’ unequally. Since India has acquired the de facto status of a 
nuclear power, endorsed by the US-India nuclear deal, the government’s 
attitude has somewhat changed. In the case of Iran, India has on several 
occasions made it clear that Iranian nuclear weapons are not desirable since it 
will further destabilise the unstable situation in the region (Khilnani et al. 2012: 
24; Sagar 2009: 805-806). In such cases as Iran and North Korea the Indian 
government is now in the camp of governments that want to prevent the spread 
of nuclear weapons. 
4. Soft Power: India’s Foreign Policy Potential 
India possesses considerable soft power. Soft power, according to Nye (2004: X) 
“is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or 
payment.” Soft power, although difficult to measure and underpin with solid 
statistical facts, is the ability of a government to co-opt other states without 
using hard power (such as for example military means or trade, which can be 
used as ‘sticks’ or ‘carrots’). Hard power is familiar, whereas soft power is more 
difficult to define, and it is more difficult to calculate its outcome. Soft power is 
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the attraction to others and is based on three resources of a country (Nye 2004: 
11): “its culture, […] its political values, […] and its foreign policies […]”22  
It is not surprising that the potential of Indian soft power is now being 
discussed in India in parallel to economic liberalisation. Liberalism emphasises 
that state ideas and culture and the governance system, rather than power and 
capabilities, are determining factors for the role of states. 
Indian culture, its functioning democracy and political pluralism, its free 
press, religious diversity, its values and cultural heritage make it an attractive 
partner. Even such diverse aspects as Gandhian non-violence and non-
cooperation, India’s cuisine, its Bollywood films, music, literature and science, 
ayurveda and yoga are considered to contribute to India’s soft power (Blarel 
2012, see also Suri 2011 on the activities of Indian diplomatic service to make 
use of India’s soft power). Political ideals, education and knowledge are part of 
this ensemble of soft power (Kumar/Kumar 2010: 45). It is the moral and 
ideological capital of the country. India’s policy makers have begun to 
emphasise the importance of its democratic process (Blarel 2012: 31); they 
underline that an open society can be a more attractive basis for a long-term 
partnership than an authoritarian regime that might get things done more 
quickly. But the positive image can be damaged by lax handling of the rule of 
law and the increase of nepotism, embezzlement and other corrupt practices 
(Pethe/Tandel/Gandhi 2012). The democracy in India has a high legitimacy, as 
surveys suggest, but this “contrasts sharply with the low capacity of the 
political system to deliver fundamental public goods like health, education and 
the rule of law” (Wagner 2010: 337).  
However, foreign policy has always been and still remains the prerogative 
of the centre, or more precisely, the privilege of the executive. Parliament plays 
a marginal role in foreign affairs. The complex, continent-sized democracy is 
often self-absorbed with its internal politics and quarrels among the many 
political parties. Foreign affairs are rarely a factor in domestic politics (except 
for differences with China and Pakistan) and they hardly play a role in the 
electoral politics of India (Ghosh 1994: 816). In the 28 Indian federal states and 
the additional autonomous regions domestic, provincial and even local factors 
usually determine the outcome of elections. The “increasing democratization of 
foreign policy in the post-Cold War era” (Holsti 1995: 58), which Holsti 
describes as a general trend, has not taken place yet in India. 
Government policies at home and abroad have an influence on the soft 
power of a country. India’s foreign policy has varied in its values, its substance 
and its implementation. Thus, foreign policy has not always been a source of 
soft power but has at times been threatening to neighbours—at least in their 
perception. 
                                                          
22 Nye (2004: 31) differentiates between military (coercion, threats), economic 
(inducement) and soft power (attraction). His table of types of power is more 
differentiated than summarised here.  
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The cultural and political aspects of soft power are often positively 
perceived outside India and contribute to the image of India as an open society. 
This positive notion also dates back to some of the founders of India and its 
artists and authors like Tagore, Ravi Shankar, Gandhi and Nehru who wanted 
India to be “a site for an alternative universality” (Khilnani et al. 2012: 69). 
Values and norms matter in global governance; it is not only the economic or 
military power. Even the militarily and economic most powerful nations need 
to consider international norms as well as public opinion about their foreign 
policy behaviour. “Narrow values and parochial cultures are less likely to 
produce soft power” (Nye 2004: 11). 
For many countries, the status of India seems to be an attractive example if 
not a model. And style in foreign policy can be as important as substance. It 
seems that India’s soft power is increasingly felt globally, possibly through and 
beyond India’s large diasporas in many parts of the world. The image of a 
bureaucratic, poor and underdeveloped nation still remains, as does the trend 
to modernisation, but the soft power aspects are increasingly seen together with 
the modernisation and economic growth of India. But this image of a 
developing country plagued by poverty, inequality, illiteracy and high levels of 
violence is only one part of the Indian society. At the same time there are 
modern sectors (particularly in the urban centres) that present the image of a 
dynamic society and economy. 
For a long time, Western observers were sceptical about India’s efforts to 
create a nation state and establish democracy. The country’s sheer size, 
diversity and heterogeneity as well as the separation of Pakistan confronted the 
founders of India with enormous problems after the colonial masters had left. 
Their vision was to create a just society, relieving it from such structural 
obstacles as castes, communalism, religiously motivated strives, feudalism and 
capitalist exploitation. The democratic, plural, federal and republican 
constitution of independent India, largely based on the British Government of 
India Act of 1935, today still highly treasured by the people, emphasises values 
such as freedom and liberty, social justice and equality. These are modern 
universal norms. And: The pluralistic society did not break apart; the Indian 
Union remained a ‘unit in diversity’ (Wagner 2010). 
The founder generation of independent India wanted the country’s foreign 
policy to be based on moral principles. Peace and complete nuclear 
disarmament, the dissolution of military blocs, solidarity among developing 
countries and good neighbourly relations with other nations were key features 
of their foreign policy ambition. Many of the attractive goals for domestic social 
and economic development as well as foreign affairs have been disappointed 
and Indian governments experienced the slide down from the moral high 
ground to communal unrest, wars with neighbouring countries, worsening of 
governance and disappointments about the failure to play the desired role in 
global politics. There were periods when Indian policies were out of touch with 
the demands of the time and the interest of the people. These times seem to 
have gone and, on the basis of two decades of economic growth, India’s self-
assertion seems to have returned. 
The root causes for the newly discovered self-esteem and confidence of the 
Indian elite lie deeper than high economic growth rates. To understand what 
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the basis of India’s explicitly globally oriented new foreign policy is, to 
appreciate its diplomatic efforts towards transcultural cooperation and its 
external engagements after decades of insular views, it is necessary to grasp the 
political, social, cultural and economic background and the history of the 
society.  
Certain facets of Indian society have contributed to and influenced the 
newly found buoyancy in foreign policy. 
First, there is the capacity of the Indian society to integrate tradition and 
modernity and forming resilient institutions. Indian politics comes across to the 
unfamiliar observer as strange, peculiar, and sometimes archaic, yet familiar 
with its democratic processes and institutions. This is the result of the capability 
of the Indian society to integrate foreign influence into existing structures over 
centuries — to form a hybrid society. Politics in India follows rules and 
regulations that combine modern and traditional strands of this complex 
society. The political elite, mainly political parties but also art and business, has 
blended well-established traditions of society with modern political institutions 
(of the Westminster-type) inherited by the British (Mitra 2012). They formed a 
political system that is characterised, to the surprise of many Western 
observers, by extraordinarily resilient political institutions (Guha 2012: 6). 
India’s institutions have proved to be robust, although they have increasingly 
come under pressure by personal greed, bribery, nepotism and corruption on a 
large scale.23 Clientelism, patrimonial networks and voting manipulation are an 
expression of the deeply ingrained pattern of group privileges in Indian society. 
Despite this endemic negative behaviour of politicians and the civil services, 
democracy is alive and popular; the majority of citizens take part in democratic 
elections and the image of a multi-cultural and secular society is upheld and 
celebrated in India (Banerjee 2012: 45). 
Second, there is the competition and cooperation between political actors at 
the national and federal level that has led to the establishing of a functioning 
federalism with checks and balances. From the days before its independence 
India has been faced with threats of separatism and the breakup of the 
subcontinent into different states. Aspirations for cultural and linguistic 
homogeneity and for economic autonomy have led to the breakup of old and 
the creation of new federal states within the Indian Union. But the 
establishment of new states and the partition of old ones have not led to the 
‘balkanisation’ of India. The democratic institutions have contributed to make 
the largest democracy of the world a functional and vibrant democracy, despite 
some serious flaws. 
                                                          
23 Examples on corruption in The Economist 2012: Power Shifts, The Economist, 
29.09.2012. www.economist.com/node/21563423/ (27.03.2013). Indian 
newspapers are full of reports on corrupt politicians or bureaucrats; see for 
example the reports on the scandal called “Coalgate” (Vaishnav 2012). 
Transparency International lists India to be 95th highest in the world of 182. 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/ (27.03.2013). 
India’s Aspirations in Global Politics 
 
33 
Third, there exists an amorphous tenet in the society that has many forms 
and orientations but a distinctive aptitude for vagueness and improvisation to 
make things work. India is not only a polymorphous and diverse society 
(Heinemann-Grüder 2011). The way the country is run and the way things 
function is often nebulous, unstructured, and amorphous. Indians themselves 
have often mentioned how good they are in planning but criticised the poor 
implementation of plans and projects. Improvisation to make things work is 
more advanced, almost to perfection, than effective implementation; muddling 
through to solve problems is a preferred conceptual approach. Nevertheless, 
Indian institutions do work, somehow. 
5. Conclusion 
No doubt, India’s star is rising and its influence in global affairs increasing. Its 
political elite is more outspoken in claiming to take over what it considers its 
rightful place in the world and, considering global challenges, from promoting 
peace to managing the financial crisis to tackling climate change, India’s 
cooperation is more and more required. The government is keen to engage 
more actively in global affairs; it is interested in changing norms. These desires 
are, however, not orientated towards fundamental changes or to abolishing 
existing norms on a large scale or, instead, establishing new regimes. Indian 
official foreign policy continues to engages strongly in multilateral diplomacy, 
but not without emphasising its own position and occasionally discontent (for 
example at the Word Trade Organization negotiations, or the refusal to join the 
International Criminal Court or the Ottawa Convention on the ban on 
landmines). The government’s ambition is to secure India a larger share in 
global decision-making within the existing Westphalian format with the nation 
state in the centre and to establishing its own preferred interpretation of the 
global rules. 
Intensified international Indian engagement will probably have effects on its 
policies. There is, for example, a debate on the government’s position on the 
’responsibility to protect’ (R2P), which would require “a more nuanced 
understanding of a whole range of concepts and principles that have guided 
our foreign policy: the principle of state sovereignty […]” (Khilnani et al. 2012: 
9). The Indian government is cautious on so-called ‘humanitarian interventions’ 
and warns that human rights values and other universal norms should not 
provide a fig-leaf for pushing great power interests. While the Indian foreign 
policy needs to “probably review its stance in the light of current challenges 
internationally”, it faces “its own internal disorders” (Bajpai 2012: 54; Bhojwani 
2012). 
India’s capacities to engage in global governance and rule-making are 
lagging behind its ambition. The administration might be big and over-staffed 
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but the Indian diplomatic service is small.24 There are probably too many paper-
pushers in government service but too few experts to cope with international 
tasks. Reforming of old and creation of new institutions is required.  
On the basis of its economic growth India could develop into a society with 
decreasing income gaps and less poverty, it could enhance the capabilities of its 
citizens and, on the basis of healthy democratic traditions and freedom of the 
press, it could be an attractive alternative to other economic powerhouses, 
particularly China. Asia could become the showcase for a competition of two 
alternative economic and political models. A prosperous India could be more 
attractive than China. 
Whether the country is a superpower in the making or an emerging power is 
a question of definition and a matter of subjective judgment. India is a multi-
faceted society with numerous contradictory trends and developments. There 
can be no doubt, however, that the country is likely to continue to play an 
increased global role and that intensified Indian global initiatives are widely 
appreciated. Economic growth has been extraordinary; investments into the 
armed forces are staggering. In spite of these trends, India is far away from 
being a global military actor with serious power projections. Its ambitions rest 
much more on economic, political and cultural factors.  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
24 According to the Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs the cadre 
strength at the headquarters and the mission abroad during 2011-12 
amounted to 3530, including junior administrative staff and posts budgeted 
by the Department of Commerce (Government of India, Ministry of External 
Affairs India 2012: 203). The Economist (2012: No frills, The Economist, 
29.09.2012 http://www.economist.com/node/21563415) compares the size of 
the diplomatic services of several countries: India’s diplomats are about one 
fifths of China’s, 1341000 population per diplomat, where as this figure is 
321000 in the case of China or 12000 in the case of Germany. 
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